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In this paper, I selectively discuss recent empirical work on the consequences of global labor mobility.
I examine how international migration affects the incomes of individuals in sending and receiving
countries and of migrants themselves.  Were a social planner to choose the migration policies that
would maximize global welfare, she would need to know, among other values, the elasticities of wages,
prices, taxes, and government transfers with respect to national labor supplies, as well as how these




University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA  92093-0519
and NBER
gohanson@ucsd.edu  1
1  INTRODUCTION 
  Given its prominent coverage by national media, the economic consequences of 
international migration would seem to be one of the burning issues or our time.  In 
receiving countries, public debate about immigration drives national politics, with recent 
electoral campaigns in Australia, Denmark, France, Switzerland, and the US each 
devoting substantial attention to the topic.  Immigrants are blamed for disrupting civil 
society, draining public coffers, and lowering wages, among other woes (Huntington, 
2004).  At the same time, skilled immigrants receive credit for spurring innovation and 
the growth of technology sectors (Freeman, 2006).  Sending countries are no less 
conflicted about labor mobility.  Emigration has brought a welcome financial windfall in 
the form of remittances (Acosta et al., 2008), but it also threatens to drain poor economies 
of their most educated workers (Docquier and Rapoport, 2008). 
  To an economist, it is no surprise that international migration is contentious.  By 
arbitraging the vast differences in wages that exist between countries, labor flows alter 
the distribution of income in sending and receiving economies alike.  In this dimension, 
international migration is similar to international trade.  Both are mechanisms for 
globalization that create winners and losers.  But there are other dimensions in which 
trade and migration differ significantly.  In most receiving countries, immigrants pay 
taxes and have the right to draw on at least some public services, changing the net tax 
burden on native residents.  Once they become citizens, immigrants generally obtain the 
right to vote, altering domestic politics (Razin, Sadka, and Swagel, 2002).  In sending 
countries, emigrants cause corresponding fiscal and political disruptions by their 
departure.  Differences between trade and migration are evident in policy (Hatton and   2
Williamson, 2005).  While most countries now belong to the World Trade Organization, 
and maintain a nominal commitment to lowering trade barriers, a multilateral agreement 
that would allow international labor mobility is a dim prospect, at best.
1 
  What does economic research have to say about the costs and benefits of 
international migration?  Should we expect economists to advocate for the free 
international movement of labor as intensely as they tend to support free trade?  The 
persistence of large differences in average income between countries is prima facie 
evidence that allowing greater international labor mobility would raise world welfare 
(Pritchett, 2006).  Allowing labor to move across borders more freely would be a simple 
and obvious way to help narrow global income gaps.   
In this paper, I selectively discuss recent empirical work on the consequences of 
global labor mobility.  I examine how international migration affects the incomes of 
individuals in sending and receiving countries and of migrants themselves.  Were a social 
planner to choose the migration policies that would maximize global welfare, she would 
need to know, among other values, the elasticities of wages, prices, taxes, and 
government transfers with respect to national labor supplies as well as how these 
parameters vary across countries.  My goal is to evaluate the progress of the literature in 
terms of providing these inputs.  In considering the effects of labor mobility, I give equal 
weight to sending and receiving countries, meaning neither receives in depth treatment.  
For discussions of literature on how immigration affects receiving countries, see Borjas 
                                                 
1 The closest sending and receiving countries have come to negotiating a multilateral deal on migration are 
discussions under Mode IV of the Doha Development Agenda of the World Trade Organization, which if 
adopted would permit the temporary movement of service providers across borders, addressing a limited set 
international labor flows.  Because of their narrow scope, even if enacted the provisions discussed would 
likely increase global labor flows by only a modest amount.  For analyses of the economic impacts of Mode 
IV liberalizations see Jansen and Piermartini (2005) and Schiff (2007).   3
(1999a) and Card (2005), and on research into how emigration affects sending countries, 
see Docquier and Rapoport (2008) and Hanson (2007).
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  Is there a case to be made against the unfettered movement of labor?  In low-
income sending countries, the complaint has long been that the wrong individuals leave 
(Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974).  In most of the developing world, the more skilled have 
the highest propensity to emigrate (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006).  If there are positive 
spillovers associated with human capital (Lucas, 1988) or education is financed through 
taxation (Bhagwati and Rodriquez, 1975), the emigration of skilled labor can hinder 
economic development (Benhabib and Jovanovic, 2006).  Possible corrections include 
taxing the emigration of skilled labor (McHale, 2008) or requiring receiving countries to 
admit more unskilled workers from the developing world (Pritchett, 2006). 
In high-income receiving countries, in contrast, the concern is that the wrong 
individuals are trying to get in (Borjas, 1999b), though this position has generated 
controversy (Card, 2005).  In the US and Europe, the average immigrant has much less 
schooling than the average native worker.   Increased inflows of low-skilled labor may 
exacerbate distortions created by social-insurance programs or means-tested entitlement 
programs (Wellisch and Walz, 1998), which would possibly increase the net tax burden 
on native residents (Borjas and Hinton, 1996) and thereby fuel political opposition to 
immigration (Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter, 2008; Facchini and Mayda, 2006). 
  By assessing the economic consequences of labor mobility, one could determine 
whether existing restrictions on immigration might be justifiable on welfare grounds or 
whether they are welfare-reducing policies, resulting from lobbying by special interests 
                                                 
2  Nor do I address the growing literature on the causes of international migration.  See Mayda (2005), 
Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2007), Rosenzweig (2007), Brücker and Defoort (2006), Belot and Hatton 
(2008), and Grogger and Hanson (2008) for recent work on the topic.   4
(Facchini and Willmann, 2007) or concerns about the impact of immigration on voters 
(Benhabib, 1996; de Melo, Grether, and Müller, 2001).  Though a WTO for international 
migration is unlikely to form any time soon, one would still like to know whether such a 
venture would be worthwhile.  In addition to providing policy makers with guidance on 
setting the scale of international migration, one would want the literature to give insight 
on its desired composition.  Emigration pessimists suggest labor outflows are too skilled 
while immigration pessimists suggest labor inflows are not skilled enough.  Both 
positions cannot be right. 
  Unfortunately, policy makers would be hard pressed to infer the effects of 
international migration on global welfare from existing literature.  The issue is not so 
much that economists disagree on the magnitudes in question.  Rather, the problem is that 
the empirical literature tends to eschew a global general equilibrium perspective.  There 
has been an immense amount of work on how immigration affects US wages, but this is 
just one outcome of interest.  There has been comparatively little work on the impact of 
immigration on non-labor income, the consequences of emigration for labor markets in 
sending countries, how global labor flows affect fiscal balances in labor importing or 
labor exporting economies, or what changes in opportunities for emigration mean for the 
incentive to acquire skill.  To be sure, economists have made progress on each of these 
topics.  But taking the literature as a whole gives the impression that the most relevant 
consideration for evaluating migration’s impact is how foreign labor inflows affect the 
earnings of low-skilled US workers.  If we want policy makers to make informed choices 
about migration policy, we have a lot more work to do. 
  In section II, I summarize facts about international migration that emerge from   5
recently available data.  In section III, I outline a simple framework for evaluating the 
welfare consequences of international migration.  In section IV, I discuss empirical 
research on the consequences of labor flows for incomes in sending and receiving 
countries and for migrants and their family members.  And in section V, I consider 
directions for future empirical work. 
 
2  TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION  
  Perhaps the most striking fact about international migration is that it is so 
uncommon.  As summarized in Figure 1, data compiled by the United Nations imply that 
in 2005 individuals residing outside of their country of birth comprised just 3.0% of the 
world’s population.  Moreover, during the last two decades the stock of international 
migrants has grown only modestly, rising from 2.2% of the world population in 1980 to 
2.9% in 1990 and marginally after that.  Given substantial differences in average incomes 
between countries, the small scale of global migration is surprising.  In 2005, per capita 
GDP (adjusted for PPP) was $33,600 in high-income OECD countries, compared to 
$9,200 in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, $8,400 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
$6,200 in the Middle East and North Africa, $3,900 in East Asia and the Pacific, $2,100 
in South Asia, and $1,700 in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Of course, differences in average 
income may overstate the gain to migration.  In section IV, I discuss recent estimates of 
cross-country earnings differences, which indicate that while per capita GDP differences 
do exaggerate the income gain to moving abroad these gains are still substantial. 
  One explanation for the small scale of international migration is that receiving-
country restrictions on immigration are binding.  Table 1 shows the share of the 
population that is foreign born in select OECD countries.  Aside from tiny Luxembourg,   6
the countries with the largest immigrant presence in 2005 are Australia (24%), 
Switzerland (24%), New Zealand (19%), and Canada (19%).  Australia, New Zealand, 
and Canada are unique among receiving countries in using a point system (rather than 
quotas) to govern applications for admission, in which individuals with higher levels of 
skill are favored for entry.  Next in line in terms of the scale of immigration are the large 
economies of Germany (13%), the US (13%), France (10%), and the UK (10%).  The US 
alone hosts 40% of immigrants living in OECD countries, making it the world’s largest 
receiving country. The US uses a quota system to govern legal immigration, with two 
thirds of visas reserved for family members of US citizens or residents.  European 
countries tend to place more emphasis on an individual’s refugee or asylee status in 
making immigrant admission decisions (Hatton and Williamson, 2004).  In the last 
decade, there have been substantial increases in foreign-born population shares in a 
number of rich countries, with the largest changes over 1995-2005 occurring in Ireland 
(4.1%), the US (3.6%), New Zealand (3.2%), the UK (2.8%), Norway (2.7%), Canada 
(2.5%), Belgium (2.4%), and Switzerland (2.4%). 
  One indication that receiving-country restrictions on immigration are binding is 
that inflows of illegal immigrants are both a substantial share of the total and on the rise.  
In the US, Passel (2008) estimates that in 2007 there were 12 million illegal immigrants, 
which accounted for 30% of the US foreign-born population, up from 28% in 2000 and 
19% in 1996.  Over two thirds of US illegal immigrants are from Mexico and Central 
America, suggesting that proximity facilitates illegal entry (Hanson, 2006).  In Europe, 
Jandl (2003) estimates that in 2003 there were 4 million illegal immigrants in the EU 15 
countries, with the largest stocks in Germany, the UK, Italy and France.  Greece, Italy,   7
Portugal and Spain have engaged in repeated recent legalizations of illegal immigrants, 
meaning that the current stock of illegal immigrants in these countries understates the 
number of immigrants who gain entry illegally. 
  In high-income OECD nations, low-income countries are an important source of 
migrants.  Table 2, using data from Beine, Docquier and Marfouk (2007), shows the 
share of the immigrant population in OECD countries by sending region.  In 2000, 67% 
of immigrants in the OECD were from a developing country, up from 54% in 1990.  
Among developing sending regions, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean are the 
most important, accounting for 20% of OECD immigrants in 2000, up from 15% in 1990.  
Half of this region’s migrants come from Mexico, which in 2000 was the source of 11% 
of OECD immigrants, making it the world’s largest supplier of migrants.  The next most 
important developing source countries are Turkey (3.5% of immigrants); China, India, 
and the Philippines (each with 3%); Vietnam, Korea, Poland, Morocco, and Cuba (each 
with 2%); and Ukraine, Serbia, Jamaica and El Salvador (each with 1%). 
  Among sending countries, there is substantial variation in the propensity to 
emigrate.  As of 2000, there were 22 developing nations with 10% or more of their adult 
population having migrated to the OECD, and 16 with emigration rates above 5%.  At the 
other extreme, 52 developing countries had emigration rates below 1%.  There is strong 
persistence in which countries send more people abroad, as seen in Figure 2, which plots 
emigration rates in 1990 and against those in 2000.  Countries with the highest 
emigration rates tend to be small, poor countries that are relatively close to the US. 
  Within sending countries, emigrants tend not to be drawn randomly from the 
population.  Figure 3, taken from Grogger and Hanson (2008), plots the log odds of   8
emigration for individuals with tertiary education (13 or more years) against the log odds 
of emigration for individuals with primary education (0 to 8 years).
3  Nearly all points lie 
above the 45 degree line, indicating that in most countries more educated individuals are 
more likely to leave.  Migrants thus appear to be positively selected in terms of 
schooling.  It is high emigration rates for the more educated that raise concerns about 
brain drain from developing countries.  Even though they are positively selected, 
migrants often have education levels far below those of native residents, owing to the fact 
that many come from countries with low average levels of schooling. 
  More skilled emigrants tend to cluster in locations where the reward to skill is 
relatively high.  This phenomenon of positive sorting is evident in Table 3, also taken 
from Grogger and Hanson (2008), which gives the share of international migrants 
residing in OECD countries by major destination region.  Countries in which the reward 
to being a skilled worker is relatively large attract a disproportionate share of more-
educated emigrants.  In the US and Canada, the difference in earnings between high-
skilled and low-skilled workers is much greater than in continental Europe, with this 
difference being even larger once one accounts for Europe’s more progressive tax 
system.  The US and Canada receive 51.4% of the OECD’s immigrants, but 65.5% of its 
immigrants with tertiary schooling.  Europe, in contrast, receives 38.4% of the OECD’s 
immigrants, but only 23.6% of its tertiary-schooled immigrants.  Realizing potential 
global welfare gains from migration may require not just allowing individuals to emigrate 
from low-income countries in larger numbers but also allowing them to sort themselves 
across receiving countries according to labor-market rewards to skill. 
                                                 
3 The log odds are defined as the log ratio of adult emigrants with a given education level to the entire adult 
population of a country (emigrants plus non-emigrants) with the same education level.   9
The small scale of international migration suggests that rich-country restrictions 
on immigration are at least partially effective at impeding labor inflows from abroad.  
Migrating legally involves costs associated with obtaining a visa, which can easily run 
into the tens of thousands of dollars.  Illegal entry is also subject to costs, with fees for 
smuggler services to cross the US-Mexico border in 2006 and 2007 averaging around 
$3,000 (Hanson, 2006) and fees to migrate from China and other distant countries to the 
US surpassing $30,000.  Either because of fixed costs to emigration or because of larger 
gains in labor-market earnings from moving abroad, more-educated individuals tend 
dominate labor outflows flows from poor sending countries to rich destinations.    
Though migrants tend to be more educated than those that remain in sending countries, 
they often have much lower education levels than native residents in receiving countries.  
As a consequence, immigration from poor countries tends to increase receiving countries’ 
relative supplies of individuals with low education levels. 
 
3  WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 
    What information would one need to gauge the effects of international migration 
on national and global welfare?  Let V(p, yi) be the indirect utility enjoyed by an 
individual with factor type i who faces price level for consumption goods and services, p, 
and who receives after-tax income available for consumption, yi.
4  To keep things simple, 
I examine the welfare effects of migration in static terms.  Another simplification is to 
assume there are just two types of individuals, high skilled (i=H) and low skilled (i=L), 
where all workers supply labor inelastically.  A third is to impose constant returns to 
                                                 
4 I take liberties with the indirect utility function by treating p as a price index and thus a scalar.  If there 
was more than one good in consumption, this would require redefining V().  As long as preferences are 
homothetic, there would be no other complications.   10
scale in production, such that goods’ prices are a function of unit factor costs.  
  Consider  the  migration  of  low-skilled labor from a low-income sending country 
(e.g., Mexico) to a high-income receiving country (e.g., the US).  For country c, the 
impact of migration on national welfare is given by  
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where α
c
i is the fraction of the population with skill type i.  The first term in the brackets 
in (1) is the impact of migration on consumer prices; the second is the impact of 
migration on factor income.  In the US, there would be an increase in the supply of low-
skilled labor (dL
c>0), whereas in Mexico there would be a decrease (dL
c<0).  Suppose 
preferences are homothetic and the marginal utility of income, ∂V
c
i/∂yi, is a constant.  In 
this case, the impact of migration on national welfare in country c can be written as, 
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where  λ
c is the marginal utility of income divided by the population (
cc LH + ) and 
cc c
i (V/p ) (p /L ) d L β=∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  would be positive in the US (as long as immigration lowers 
the average price of goods) and negative in Mexico (as long as emigration raises the 
average price of goods).  Stating the change in welfare relative to national income, 
cc c c c
LH YL yH y =+ , equation (2) becomes, 
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where 
cc c /Y β= β  , 
cc
LH () θθ is the share of low-skilled labor (high-skilled labor) in 
national income,  iL i i (y/L ) ( L / y ) ε=∂ ∂  is the elasticity of income for factor type i with   11
respect to the supply of low-skilled labor, and M
c=dL
c.  Immigration (emigration) of low-
skilled labor lowers (raises) low-skilled wages in the US (Mexico) but raises (lowers) 
high-skilled wages in the US (Mexico), owing to the fact that  0
c
LL ε <  and  0
c
HL ε> .   
    For the US, the term in brackets is equivalent to the immigration surplus, 
described by Borjas (1999a), but expressed in terms of two factors of production, as in 
Euwals and Hans Roodenburg (2004).  For the US, the immigration surplus is positive, 
since immigration raises GNP, defined to exclude migrant income.  The change in 
Mexico’s GNP, defined to include the incomes of non-migrants and migrants, is also 
positive.  Since GNP increases in both countries, global welfare rises. 
    Figure 4 captures the changes in income more formally, where I assume there is a 
single good and that migration equalizes wages for low-skilled labor in the two countries.  
The horizontal width of the box in Figure 4 gives the total labor supply in the US and 
Mexico,  L .  US (Mexico) labor demand is given by D
us (D
mx), with origin 0
us (0
mx).  In 
the pre-migration equilibrium, at point 1, US labor supply is  1
us L  and Mexico’s labor 
supply is  1
us LL − , causing US wages to exceed Mexican wages: 
us mx
LL yy > .   
    If low-skilled labor is allowed to move freely between the countries, there will 
migration from Mexico to the US up to the point where US and Mexican wages are 
equalized at 
*
L y , shown by point 2, with low-skilled wages rising in Mexico and falling in 
the US.  US labor supply expands to  2
us L  and Mexico’s contracts to  2
us LL − , as 
21
us us LL − workers move between countries.  In the US, the loss in income for native low-
skilled workers is given by area A and the gain in income for native high-skilled workers 
is given by area A+B.  The change in US GNP equals area B, which is the immigration   12
surplus.  Migrants earn income C+D+E, meaning that US GDP (which includes the 
income that migrants earn in the US) rises by an amount equal to area B+C+D+E. 
    In Mexico, native high-skilled workers have an income loss equal to area D+F, 
due to the departure of low-skilled labor.  Non-migrating native low-skilled workers have 
an income gain equal to area F and migrating native low-skilled workers have an income 
gain equal to area C+D.  Mexico’s gain in GNP equals area C, though it has a loss in 
GDP equal to area D+E.  The gain in world national income equals B+C, as migration 
eliminates differences in labor productivity between countries.  To ensure that 
international migration generates Pareto gains in welfare, US low-skilled workers would 
have to receive an income transfer equal to at least A and Mexican high-skilled workers 
would have to receive a transfer of at least D+F. 
  A change in the environment that could affect the implications of migration for 
income is the introduction of redistributive taxes and transfers.  Redefine yi as after-tax, 
or net, income, which depends on pre-tax wage income, wi, the income-tax rate, ti, and 
government transfers, gi, such that 
      ( ) 1
cc c c
ii i i yw t g = −+.       ( 4 )  
Under the assumption that 
cc
H L ww >  (i.e., there are positive returns to skill), an economy 
with progressive taxes that redistributes income from high-income to low-income 
individuals would have that 
cc
H L tt >  and 
cc c c
H HL L g/ w g/ w < .  Returning to equation (3), 
the elasticity of net income with respect to the supply of low-skilled labor,
c
iL ε , would 
account for how immigration affects not just pre-tax labor income, 
c
i w , but also the tax 
rate, 
c
i t , and government transfers, 
c
i g .  This elasticity can be written as,   13
      1
cc c c c c c
iL w,i w,iL i t ,i t ,iL g ,i g ,iL (t ) ε= ρη − − ρ η + ρη .    (5) 
where for factor type i 
c
h,i ρ is the share of income type h in net income and 
c
h,iL η  is the 
elasticity of income type h with respect to the migration of low-skilled labor (where 
w=pre-tax wages, g=government transfers, and t=taxes). 
    To interpret (5), consider the impact of low-skilled immigration on high-skill 
labor in the US.  Based on Figure 4, an inflow of low-skilled foreign labor raises wages 
for high-skilled US workers (since  0
c
w,HL η > ).  However, it might also raise the net tax 
burden on these individuals.  If in the US the net tax burden (
cc c
ii i tw g − ) is positive for the 
high skilled and negative for the low skilled and immigrants have the right to receive 
government transfers, then low-skilled immigration could increase US government 
spending by more than it increases tax revenues.  In order to balance the government 
budget, the US would have to increase tax rates and/or decrease government transfers.  
Were the US to keep its progressive tax system in place, the net tax burden on the high 
skilled would rise, offsetting their gain in pre-tax income.  For US low-skilled workers, 
the loss from low-skilled immigration may be greater than without a tax system in place.  
Not only would their pre-tax wage fall as a result of the increase in low-skilled labor 
supply (since  0
c
w,LL η< ) but they could also face lower transfers and/or higher taxes. 
    If the sending country also has a progressive tax system, the departure of low-
skilled emigrants could reduce the net tax burden on non-migrants, allowing the 
government to decrease taxes on the high skilled and/or raise transfers to the low skilled.  
However, the tax effects from low-skilled emigration are less clear cut once one accounts 
for life cycle features of taxes and transfers.  Many of the transfers individuals receive 
over their lifetime come in their youth in the form of public education and subsidized   14
health care.  If low skilled workers enjoy these transfers while young and emigrate before 
entering the labor force, sending country governments would be denied the returns on the 
investments they have made in these individuals.  In principle, low-skilled emigration has 
the potential to increase the net tax burden on non-migrants in the sending country.  With 
an increase in high-skilled emigration, the change in net tax revenue for the sending 
country is likely to be negative, given the magnitude of the investments sending country 
governments make in their education and the high incomes these individuals earn. 
    Equations (3) and (5) give a partial inventory of the parameters policy makers 
would need to know to assess the welfare consequences of international migration.  These 
include the elasticities of wages, tax rates, government transfers, and consumption prices 
with respect to national labor inflows and outflows.  Allowing labor supply to be elastic 
would exacerbate the welfare effects of tax and transfer policies.   
    The effects of migration on skill accumulation are also important, given the 
centrality of human capital to the process of economic growth.  Theoretical literature has 
devoted substantial attention to the impact of emigration on the incentive to acquire 
human capital in sending countries (Docquier and Rapoport, 2008)).  Absent distortions, 
moving labor from a low productivity to high productivity environment raises global 
income.  However, if there are positive externalities associated with learning (e.g., Lucas, 
1988), the exodus of skilled labor from a country may have adverse consequences for 
economic development in sending countries (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974).  In theory, 
the impact of brain drain on a sending country can be positive or negative.  Miyagiwa 
(1991) develops a model in which, because of human capital spillovers, the migration of 
skilled labor from a low-wage, skill-scare economy to a high-wage, skill-abundant   15
economy reinforces the incentive for brain drain, depleting the low-wage country of 
skilled labor.  In Wong and Yip (1999), the negative effects of brain drain on the stock of 
human capital reduce the labor-exporting country’s growth rate. 
It is also possible, however, that emigration would on net increase the supply of 
human capital in a country, creating a brain gain (Stark and Wang, 2002).  With high 
incomes for skilled labor in rich countries and uncertainty over who will succeed in 
emigrating, the option of moving abroad may induce individuals to accumulate enough 
additional human capital to compensate for the loss in skill to labor outflows (Beine, 
Docquier and Marfouk, 2001).  Mountford (1997) shows that in the presence of human-
capital externalities an emigration-induced increase in the incentive to acquire skill can 
help an economy escape a poverty trap and move to a high-growth equilibrium. 
  To assess the welfare consequences of international migration, policy makers 
would need to know, in addition to the elasticities in (5), how labor mobility affects the 
incentive to acquire skill in sending and receiving countries.  The framework I have 
outlined, while very simple, has demanding informational requirements for assessing the 
welfare effects of migration.  I next examine how successful the literature has been in 
meeting these informational requirements.  
 
4  EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 
I begin the discussion by considering the gain in income to migrants and evidence 
on the extent to which migrants share these gains with family members in the sending 
country.  I then consider the impact of global labor flows on labor market earnings, net 
tax burdens, and skill acquisition in sending and receiving countries. 
   16
A.  INCOME GAINS TO MIGRANTS 
Consider the income gain to migrating from Mexico to the United States.  In 
2000, per capita GDP in Mexico was $9,700, compared with $34,500 in the US.
5  While 
the income gain from leaving Mexico for the US is likely to be large, it is surely 
overstated by the difference in average income, reported in Table 4. 
One issue is that workers in Mexico and the US have different levels of education 
and labor market experience.  At the very least, one would want to compare incomes for 
individuals with similar observable characteristics.  Using data from US and Mexico 
population censuses, Hanson (2006) reports that in 2000 the average hourly wage for a 28 
to 32 year old male with 9 to 11 years of education was $2.40 in Mexico and $8.70 for 
recent Mexican immigrants in the US.  At a labor supply of 35 hours per week and 48 
weeks per year this would yield a yearly income gain of $10,600.  Combining household 
data in developing countries with data from the US Census, Clemons, Montenegro, and 
Pritchett (2008) estimate that in 2000 the annual income gain to migration for a 35 year-
old urban Mexican male with 9 to 12 years of education was $9,200. 
Simply by controlling for observable characteristics, the estimated gain to 
migration from Mexico to the US falls from $25,000 to $10,000.  Even still, migrants and 
non-migrants with similar education and experience may not be comparable.  They may 
differ in terms of unobserved cognitive ability, motor skills, or motivation.  The data in 
Figure 3 suggest that emigrants are positively selected in terms of schooling.  If migrants 
are also positively selected on unobserved characteristics, the estimated $10,000 gain 
would overstate the benefits from Mexican emigration.  Using a range of econometric 
techniques, Clemons, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) attempt to control for self-
                                                 
5 All monetary figures are in 2000 US dollars and adjusted for PPP.   17
selection on unobservables in migration, as well as for the possibility that the gains to 
migration include compensation for the cost of moving abroad.  They find that observed 
gains to migration overstate true gains by 1.25 to 1.5 times.  For the Mexico-US case, the 
gain to migration would fall from $10,000 to $6,700 to $8,000. 
A better comparison would be to examine income for the same individual, before 
and after migration.  Rosenzweig (2007) uses data from the New Immigrant Survey to 
estimate the change in income for new US permanent legal immigrants in 2003.  He 
compares their current US earnings with their earnings in the last job they held in their 
country of origin.  For a legal immigrant from Mexico with 9 to 12 years of education, 
the average gain in income is $15,900 (at 35 hours a week and 48 weeks a year).   
Comparing the same individuals in two countries corrects for selection on unobservables 
but introduces other complications.  If preparation for migration means a reduction in 
labor supply, Rosenzweig’s estimates may overstate the gains to migration.
6 
An alternative way to gauge the income gain to migration would be to compare 
the incomes of two individuals from the same source country where one is randomly 
selected to migrate to a particular destination and the other is not.  McKenzie, Gibson, 
and Stillman (2006) use data from New Zealand’s visa lottery to examine such an 
experiment.  They compare the income of lottery losers in Tonga (i.e., those who applied 
for the visa lottery and were rejected) with the incomes of lottery winners who migrated 
from Tonga in New Zealand.  The average increase in income is 263%, which is half as 
large as the difference in Tongan and New Zealand per capita GDP.  McKenzie et al. are 
also able to compare the incomes of lottery losers in Tonga with the incomes they 
                                                 
6 Since Rosenzweig (2007) examines legal immigrants, his figures not directly comparable to Hanson 
(2006) or Clemons, Montenegro, and Prichett (2008), whose samples include legal and illegal immigrants.   18
expected to have earned if they had migrated.  Expected gains are only 84%.  Relatively 
small expected gains may reflect informational asymmetries between domestic and 
foreign residents regarding labor market conditions abroad. 
The income gain from migration captures the gross return from moving to another 
country.  While there has been research on the role of migration networks in migration 
decisions (e.g., Munshi, 2003), there is little work that estimates the actual cost of 
migration.  These costs include transport expenses in moving abroad, time lost in 
changing labor markets, administrative fees for legal migration, border crossing costs in 
illegal migration, the psychic costs of leaving home, and perceived changes in uncertainty 
from living and working in another country.  The absence of comprehensive data on 
migration costs means that we are far from being able to produce estimates of the change 
in net income emigration. 
  Through remittances, migrants share a portion of their extra income with family 
members at home.  Remittances have increased markedly in East Asia and the Pacific, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  As of 2005, 
remittances exceeded official development assistance in all regions except Sub-Saharan 
Africa and were greater than 65% of foreign direct investment inflows in all regions 
except Europe and Central Asia.  Among the smaller countries of Central America, the 
Caribbean, and the South Pacific, remittances account for a large share of national 
income, ranging from 10% to 17% of GDP in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua, and representing an astounding 53% of 
GDP in Haiti (Acosta, Fajnzylber, and Lopez, 2007). 
  Having migrants abroad provides insurance to households, helping them smooth   19
consumption in response to income shocks, be they domestic or foreign.  Yang (2007) 
examines changes in remittances to households in the Philippines before and after the 
Asian financial crisis.  As of 1997, 6% of Philippine households had a member that had 
migrated abroad.  Some had gone to countries in the Middle East, whose currencies 
appreciated sharply against the Philippine peso in 1997-1998, while others had gone to 
East Asia, where currencies appreciated less sharply or even depreciated.  Consistent with 
consumption smoothing, remittances increased more for households whose migrants 
resided in countries that experienced stronger currency appreciation against the peso. 
  There is some evidence that increases in remittances are associated with increased 
expenditure on education and health.  Yang (2007) also examines changes in household 
expenditure and labor supply in the Philippines.  Households with migrants in countries 
experiencing stronger currency appreciation vis-à-vis the peso had larger increases in 
spending on child education, spending on durable goods, children’s school attendance, 
and entrepreneurial investments.  In these households, the labor supply of 10-17 year old 
children fell by more, particularly for boys.  Using cross-section data on Mexican states, 
Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) find a positive correlation between emigration and 
business formation.  These results suggest migration may help household overcome credit 
constraints imposed by sending country financial markets. 
 
  Differences in per capita GDP across countries appear to overstate the income 
gain from migrating abroad by two to three times.  Even after accounting for this bias, the 
gross income gain to migration is still large.  For a young male with some secondary 
education, Clemons, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) estimate the median annual gain 
from migrating to the US to be $11,200, while Rosenzweig estimates the annual gain to   20
legal migration to the US to be $10,600.  The net gains to migration are unknown, 
however, given the absence of information about the magnitude of total migration costs.  
Remittances spread the income gains from migration to individuals in sending countries, 
allow households to smooth consumption in response to income shocks, and perhaps 
relax credit constraints on households.   
 
B.  LABOR MARKET CONSEQUENCES  
    The labor-market consequences of international migration have inspired intense 
debate among scholars.  The vast majority of research has focused on the impact of labor 
inflows on the US wage structure.  Only recently has the literature begun to examine 
other receiving countries or effects on sending economies.  The US literature has been 
extensively reviewed elsewhere (e.g., Borjas, 1999a; Card, 2005), allowing me to cover 
the topic briefly.  I summarize the current state of the debate and identify questions that 
are central to resolving it. 
    Research using data on the national US labor market suggests that immigration 
depresses wages for US workers.  Borjas (2003) defines labor markets at the national 
level according to a worker’s education and labor-market experience.  Over the period 
1960 to 2000, education-experience cells in which immigrant labor supply growth has 
been larger – such as for young high school dropouts –had slower wage growth, even 
after controlling for education or experience specific wage shocks.  The evidence is 
consistent with immigration having depressed wages for low-skilled US workers.  The 
concern about this approach is that it might confound immigration with other labor-
market shocks that have hurt low-skilled workers, such as skill-biased technological 
change.  Absent controls for these other shocks, one cannot be sure the attributed wage   21
changes are really due to immigration.  
    Applying a similar approach to Canada, Aydemir and Borjas (1997) find 
comparable evidence of the wage effects of migration.  In Canada, where immigration 
has been dominated by workers toward to the top end of the skill distribution, 
immigration is negatively correlated with wages across education-experience cells, with 
more-educated workers being the ones who have suffered the largest wage effects.  Since 
Canada is presumably subject to many of the same technology shocks as the US, it would 
not appear that unobserved technology shocks could explain away the wage effects of 
immigration in both countries. 
    The national-level approach also yields comparable results of the wage effects of 
migration in sending countries.  Mishra (2005) finds a positive correlation between 
emigration and wages across education-experience cells in Mexico.  In Mexico, 
emigrants come disproportionately from the middle of the skill distribution, meaning 
workers with close to average levels of education are those that have had the largest wage 
gains from labor outflows.  Aydemir and Borjas (1997) obtain similar results and also 
find that the elasticity of wages with respect to labor supply is roughly similar in Canada, 
Mexico, and the US.  In all three countries, a 10% change in labor supply due to 
migration is associated with a 4% to 6% change in wages. 
    An older and larger literature has searched for immigration’s impact by 
correlating the change in wages for low-skilled US natives with the change in the 
immigrant presence in local labor markets, typically at the level of US cities.  These area 
studies tend to find that immigration has little if any impact on US wages (Borjas, 
1999a).  Card (2005) argues that if immigration has affected the US wage structure one   22
should see larger declines in the wages of native high school dropouts (relative to, say, 
native high school graduates) in US cities where the relative supply of high school 
dropouts has expanded by more.  In fact, the correlation between the relative wage and 
the relative supply of US high school dropouts across US cities is close to zero.   
    Yet, one type of cross-sectional evidence is consistent with immigration having 
lowered wages.  Cortes (2008) finds that in the 1980s and 1990s US cities with larger 
inflows of low-skilled immigrants experienced larger reductions in prices for 
housekeeping, gardening, child care, dry cleaning and other labor-intensive services.  A 
10% increase in the local immigrant population is associated with decreases in prices for 
labor-intensive services of 1.3% percent.  One obvious mechanism through which 
immigration could have lowered prices is through its effects on wages.
7 
    The area study approach also has its problems.  Immigrants may tend to settle in 
US regions in which job growth is stronger, causing one to underestimate the wage 
impact of immigration when using city or state-level data.  As a correction, many studies 
instrument for growth in local immigrant labor supply using lagged immigrant settlement 
patterns.  But this strategy requires strong identifying assumptions.  It would be invalid, 
for instance, if the labor demand shocks that influence immigrant settlement patterns are 
persistent over time (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997). 
    Research on other receiving countries tends to report negligible estimated impacts 
of immigration on wages.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a massive 
migration of Russian Jews to Israel, which increased the Israeli population by 12% in the 
span of just four years.  Over the course of the Russian influx, Friedberg (2001) does find 
                                                 
7 In Israel, Lach (2008) find negative prices effects from immigration, which are not limited to labor-
intensive goods.  He attributes these to immigrants having more elastic demand and lower search costs.   23
that occupations that employed more immigrants had slower wage growth, but this 
correlation falls to zero once she instruments for immigrants’ occupational choice.
8  In 
applications of the area studies approach outside of the US, findings of little or no impact 
of immigration on regional wages include Addison and Worswick (2002) for Australia; 
Pischke and Velling (1997) for Germany; Zorlu and Hartog (2005) for the Netherlands 
and Norway (2005); Carrasco, Jimeno, and Ortega (2008) for Spain; and Dustmann, 
Fabri, and Preston (2005) in the UK.
9 
    In light of the theoretical results presented in section III, it is surprising that an 
immigration-induced increase in the relative supply of low-skilled US labor would not 
depress relative wages for native workers in this skill group.  Yet, the estimated wage 
impact of immigration depends in part on whether one treats the labor market as national 
or local in scope.  The literature offers several possible ways to reconcile the differences 
in results at the national and sub-national levels. 
 
1. An immigrant influx in a region induces natives to move out, such that estimating 
immigration’s labor-impact at the sub-national level understates its true effect. 
    The impact of immigration on the migration of native labor is another issue about 
which there is disagreement.  Card (2001, 2005) finds that across US cities, higher 
presence of low-skilled immigrants is associated with higher levels of employment of 
low-skilled labor, with one new immigrant on net adding about one new net worker to a 
labor market, suggesting that native outmigration does not offset the labor supply effects 
of arriving immigrant workers.  Pischke and Velling (1997) find a similar absence of 
                                                 
8 In earlier work, Hunt (1992) and Carrington and de Lima (1996) find evidence of minimal labor-market 
effects from the forced return of expatriates in France and Portugal, following the end of colonialism. 
9 Negative wage effects of immigration have been found in Germany (De New and Zimmerman, 1994) and 
Austria (Hofer and Huber, 2003).   24
native displacement effects in Germany.  Borjas (2006), using the regional counterpart to 
the national-level education-experience cells in Borjas (2003), comes to the opposite 
conclusion.  He finds that the growth in the native workforce is smaller in regional 
education-experience cells in which the growth in immigrant presence has been larger.  
Moreover, he shows that not accounting for the internal migration of natives causes area 
studies regressions to understate the wage effects of immigration by about half.  Hatton 
and Taini (2005), using data on regional labor markets in the UK, also find evidence that 
the arrival of immigrant workers displaces local native workers. 
  We  have  another  instance  in which time-series evidence suggests one thing while 
cross-sectional evidence suggests something else.  The cross-section evidence is again 
subject to concerns about the endogeneity of immigrant settlement patterns, but these 
concerns have been insufficient for the literature to come to a consensus about how 
immigration affects the location decisions of natives. 
 
2.  Immigration induces firms to raise investment and increase innovation, partially or 
fully offsetting the wage impacts of labor inflows.   
    While this idea is plausible, there is relatively little empirical research on the 
impact of immigration on investment or innovation at the regional or national level.   
There is some evidence that immigration is associated with changes in technology, or at 
least with changes in production techniques.  Lewis (2005) finds that regions absorb 
immigrants through their industries becoming more intensive in the use of immigrant 
labor.  In particular, industries in US metropolitan areas that have received larger inflows 
of low-skilled immigrant labor have increased their relative labor intensity by more.   
These industries have also been slower to adopt new technologies, suggesting changes in   25
labor supply may affect incentives for technology adoption, as in Acemoglu (1998).   
Gandal, Hanson, and Slaughter (2004) find evidence of similar within-industry changes 
in factor intensity in response to the Russian immigration in Israel in the early 1990s.  
Incidentally, Lewis’ (2005) results rule out changes in sectoral mix accounting for 
regional absorption of immigrant labor, as could occur in a simple Heckscher-Ohlin 
model.  He finds little evidence that regions have absorbed incoming immigrants by 
shifting employment towards sectors that are more intensive in low-skilled labor.       
 
3.  Immigrant and native workers are imperfect substitutes in production, such that on net 
foreign labor inflows do not hurt native workers (and may actually help them). 
    In initial work, Ottaviano and Peri (2007) found evidence that immigrant and 
native labor were imperfect substitutes.  They estimated a negative and significant 
correlation between immigrant-native relative wages and immigrant-native relative 
employment, across Borjas’ (2003) education-experience cells.  However, their results 
appear sensitive to how one defines skill groups.  Simply by dropping high school 
students from the sample, the finding of imperfect substitutability between immigrants 
and natives disappears.  More generally, Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2008) show that 
across a wide variety of specifications one cannot reject the hypothesis that comparably 
skilled immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes in employment, in line with earlier 
work by Jaeger (1997).  Whatever one thinks about the wage effects of immigration, low-
skilled immigrant and native workers appear to be in the same labor market.  
 
    To date, the literature offers two approaches for estimating the wage effects of 
migration, which yield quite different results.  The national-level approach is subject to   26
concerns about how one controls for changes in technology, though these should be at 
least partly allayed by the fact that countries with very different types of migration shocks 
exhibit similar migration wage elasticities.  The area studies approach is subject to 
concerns about the endogeneity of immigrant settlement patterns, with it being difficult to 
assess the validity of proposed solutions to this problem.   
    The literature’s near obsession with the wage impacts of immigration leaves the 
impression that these are sufficient to identify immigration’s impact on national income.  
In an economy without distortions, even if all workers lose from immigration, the income 
gain to capital owners will be sufficient to ensure that national income increases.  Indeed, 
it is unlikely that an economy could experience a gain in national income from 
immigration without at least some workers being hurt.  So far, empirical research has had 
little to say about the impact of immigration on non-labor income. 
 
C.  FISCAL CONSEQUENCES 
By changing labor supply, international migration may alter a country’s fiscal 
accounts.  With emigrants being positively selection in terms of schooling, sending 
countries are deprived of high-income taxpayers.  To the extent that education and health 
care are publicly provided, sending countries may have made substantial investments in 
these individuals while young only to have receiving countries reap the returns. 
While there is a large body of theoretical literature on the taxation of skilled 
emigration (see, e.g., Bhagwati and Wilson, 1989; Docquier and Rapoport, 2007), 
empirical research on the subject is sparse.  In a recent contribution, Desai, Kapur, and 
McHale (2008) examine the fiscal effects of brain drain from India.  In 2000, individuals 
with tertiary education accounted for 61% of Indian emigrants but just 5% of India’s total   27
population.  Between 1990 and 2000, the emigration rate for the tertiary educated rose 
from 2.8% to 4.3%, but from just 0.3% to 0.4% for the population as a whole.  Desai et 
al. examine Indian emigration to the US, which in 2000 was host to 65% of India’s 
skilled emigrants.  First, they use Mincer wage regressions to produce a counterfactual 
income series that gives emigrants the income they would have earned in India based on 
their observed characteristics and the returns to these characteristics in India.  On the tax 
side, they calculate income tax losses by running the counterfactual income series 
through the Indian income tax schedule.  They also calculate indirect tax losses using 
estimates of indirect tax payments per unit of gross national income.  On the spending 
side, they calculate expenditure savings by taking the categories for which savings would 
exist and then estimating savings per individual.  Their results suggest Indian emigration 
to the US cost India net tax contributions of 0.24% of GDP in 2000.  Remittances by 
skilled emigrants generated a tax gain of 0.1% of GDP, partially offsetting these losses.  
For India, the tax consequences of skilled emigration appear to be small, though small 
countries with high emigration rates may face larger impacts. 
In receiving countries, immigration may exacerbate inefficiencies associated with 
a country’s system of public finance.  Where immigrants pay more in taxes than they 
receive in government benefits, immigration reduces the net tax burden on native 
taxpayers. The total impact of immigration on native residents—the sum of the 
immigration surplus (the pretax income gain) and the net fiscal transfer from 
immigrants—would be unambiguously positive.  With progressive income taxes and 
means-tested entitlement programs in many receiving countries, positive fiscal 
consequences from immigration would appear to be more likely the more skilled the   28
labor inflow.  In contexts where immigrants pay less in taxes than they receive in 
government benefits, immigration increases the net tax burden on natives, necessitating 
an increase in taxes on natives, a reduction in government benefits to natives, or 
increased borrowing from future generations.   
There are also dynamic fiscal effects from immigration (Auerbach and 
Oreopoulos, 1999).  If the net tax burden on residents of a country is expected to increase 
in the future, immigration increases the tax base over which this burden can be spread 
and reduces the increase that natives would have to bear (Collado and Valera, 2004).  But 
this is only true if the descendents of immigrants see their incomes rise to a point where 
they make positive net tax contributions.  If the children of immigrants have their 
educational attainment lag behind that of natives, high levels of immigration today could 
instead increase the future tax burden on the native population. 
In the US, immigrant households have historically made greater use of subsidized 
health care, income support to poor families, food stamps and other types of public 
assistance (Borjas and Hinton, 1996).  Immigrant households tend to be larger than native 
households, have more children, and have very low incomes, making them eligible for 
more types of benefits.  In the last decade, however, the difference between immigrant 
and native use of welfare programs in the US has fallen or even reversed, largely because 
of a sweeping reform of welfare policy in 1996, one effect of which was to restrict non-
citizens from having access to many federally funded benefit programs.  While 
immigrant households still make greater use of public healthcare than native households, 
they make comparable or less use of other types of public assistance (Borjas, 2003; 
Capps et al., 2005).  In the European Union, the concern is that enlargement to include   29
lower income countries in Central and Eastern Europe will lead to low-skilled migration 
to higher income countries, and increases in welfare usage (Sinn, 2002). 
Calculating the total fiscal consequences of immigration, while straightforward 
conceptually, is difficult in practice. To estimate them correctly, one needs to know many 
details about the income, spending, and employment behavior of the population of 
immigrants. As a result, there are few comprehensive analyses of the fiscal impact of 
immigration. In one of the few such studies, Smith and Edmonston (1996) estimate that 
in 1996 immigration imposed a short-run fiscal burden on the average US native 
household of $200, or 0.2 percent of U.S. GDP. In that year, a back of the envelope 
calculation suggests that, following the logic of equation (3), the immigration surplus was 
about 0.1 percent of GDP (Borjas, 1999b), meaning that immigration in the mid-1990s 
reduced the annual income of US residents by about 0.1 percent of GDP.  Given the 
uncertainties involved in making this calculation, this estimate is unlikely to be 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.  While we cannot say with much conviction 
whether the aggregate fiscal impact of immigration on the US economy is positive or 
negative, it does appear the total impact is small.
10 
    Tax and transfer policies create a motivation for a government to restrict 
immigration, even where the level of immigration is set by a social planner.  If 
immigrants are primarily individuals with low incomes relative to natives, increased labor 
inflows may exacerbate distortions created by social-insurance programs or means-tested 
entitlement programs, making a departure from free immigration the constrained social 
                                                 
10 This estimate is based on short run considerations.  Allowing for dynamics could change the results.   30
optimum (Wellisch and Walz, 1998).
11  Pay as you go pension systems create a further 
incentive for politicians to manipulate the timing and level of immigration (Scholten and 
Thum, 1996; Razin and Sadka, 1999).  Given its graying population and unfunded 
pension liabilities, one might expect Western Europe to be opening itself more 
aggressively to foreign labor inflows.  However, concerns over possible increases in 
expenditure on social insurance programs may temper the region’s enthusiasm for using 
immigration to solve its pension problems (Boeri and Brücker, 2005). 
    In the US, the fiscal consequences of immigration appear to matter for 
immigration policy preferences.  Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) find that U.S. 
natives who are more exposed to immigrant fiscal pressures – those living in states that 
have large immigrant populations and that provide immigrants access to generous public 
benefits – are more in favor of reducing immigration.  This public-finance cleavage is 
strongest among natives with high earnings potential, who tend to be in high tax brackets.  
Facchini and Mayda (2006) obtain similar results for Europe.  More educated individuals 
are more opposed to immigration in countries where immigrants are less skilled and 
governments are more generous in the benefits they provide. 
 
    The evidence that does exist suggests that the short run consequences of 
international migration are modest.  However, the literature has only examined a handful 
of countries.  While there is theoretical literature on the dynamic consequences of 
migration, as well as its impacts on political economy, empirical work on these subjects 
                                                 
11 In the long run, immigrants may affect voting outcomes directly through their participation in the 
political process (Razin, Sadka, and Swagel, 2002; Ortega, 2004).   31
is sparse.  We cannot say much to policy markers about the net fiscal impacts of 
international migration other than preliminary evidence suggests they are not very big. 
 
D.  HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
  International migration has the potential to affect the accumulation of human 
capital in both sending and receiving countries.  In receiving countries, migration may 
increase the relative supply of high-skilled labor (e.g., Canada), low-skilled labor (e.g., 
Spain), or both high and low-skilled labor (e.g., the US).  To the extent wages fall for the 
skill group whose relative supply increases, native workers have an incentive to select out 
of that skill group.  Alternatively, immigration may affect native schooling decisions by 
increasing competition for scarce educational resources.   
Using data on the US, Borjas (2004) estimates a negative correlation between the 
number of foreign students and the number of native-born students in university graduate 
programs, suggesting that foreign students may crowd out natives.  Even with crowding 
out, the arrival of foreign students may still lead to an increase in the net supply of skilled 
labor in the US.  Stuen, Mobarak, and Maskus (2006) find that university departments 
with more foreign graduate students have more publications in scientific journals, 
suggesting inflows of foreign students may spur knowledge creation.  
Looking lower down the skill ladder, Betts and Lofstrom (2000) and Hoxby 
(1998) present evidence that immigration adversely affects college attendance for US 
natives, particularly for minority students, and Betts (1999) finds that increases in the 
number of student-age immigrants in a US locality are associated with decreases in the   32
likelihood that local black and Latino students will complete a high school degree.
12  For 
Israel, Paserman and Gould (2008) find that having more immigrants in one’s grade 
school class is associated with a lower likelihood that a student will subsequently 
matriculate in or graduate from high school.  While the precise mechanisms behind these 
relationships are unclear, it does appear that the performance of native students 
deteriorates following a local influx of immigrant students. 
In sending economies, the focus of research has been on how opportunities for 
emigration affect the incentive to acquire skill.  In poor countries, the income gain from 
emigration is often substantial.  Moreover, the gain to migration is larger for individuals 
with higher education levels (Rosenzweig, 2007; Grogger and Hanson, 2008).  An 
increase in the probability that individuals from a poor sending country will be allowed to 
emigrate to the US or Europe may thus increase the incentive to obtain higher levels of 
education.  The quantitative impact of this brain gain effect depends on the elasticity of 
the sending-country supply of educational services and the perceived probability of 
migrating successfully.  Where seats in colleges and universities are in limited supply, 
increases in the demand for higher education may have little effect on the local number of 
educated workers.
13  Relatedly, where receiving countries allocate immigration visas in a 
non-random manner (say, by reserving entry slots for family members of existing US 
residents), many sending-country residents may have little hope of moving abroad, 
leaving their incentive to acquire skill unaffected by emigration opportunities.  
Only a handful of empirical papers have examined the relationship between 
emigration and human-capital accumulation.  For a cross-section of countries, Beine, 
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Docquier, and Rapoport (2006) report a positive correlation between emigration to rich 
countries and the increase in the stock of human capital.  This finding is consistent with 
emigration increasing the incentive to acquire education.  However, it is not clear that one 
can make inferences about the causal impact of brain drain on educational attainment 
from the cross-section correlation between emigration and schooling.  Individuals are 
likely to treat education and migration as joint decisions, making the two outcomes 
simultaneously determined.  For causal inference, one would need to observe changes in 
human-capital accumulation in sending countries before and after there were unexpected 
and exogenous shocks in the opportunity to emigrate.  The literature has yet to uncover 
such experiments in the data, meaning we still have an incomplete sense of how 
emigration affects supplies of human capital. 
In a related line of research, the literature examines whether studying abroad is a 
vehicle for more permanent migration.  In the US, many of the individuals who succeed 
in obtaining temporary or permanent immigration visas reserved for skilled workers are 
foreign students enrolled in US universities.  Coming to the US on a student visa may 
increase the likelihood of obtaining an employment visa.  Studying abroad is thus partly 
about completing higher education and partly about creating opportunities for migration.  
Rosenzweig (2006) finds that the latter effect tends to dominate.  In the US, the inflow of 
foreign students is higher from countries where earnings for skilled workers are lower 
and where university capacity is higher, not lower. 
Other evidence suggests international migration may increase the flow of ideas 
between countries.  In China, India, and Taiwan, the migration of skilled labor to Silicon 
Valley – where Indian and Chinese immigrants account for one third of the engineering   34
labor force – has been followed by increased trade with and investment from the US 
(Saxenian, 2002).  Spilimbergo (2008) suggests there is an association between a 
country’s democratic tendencies and the political systems of the countries under which its 
students did their university training.  He finds a positive correlation between the 
democracy index in for a sending country and the average democracy index in the 
countries in which a country’s emigrant students have studied.  Migration flows may also 
help erode barriers to trade.  Successive waves of emigration from China have created 
communities of ethnic Chinese throughout Southeast Asia, as well as in South Asia and 
on the east coast of Africa.  Rauch and Trindade (2002) find that bilateral  trade is 
positively correlated with the interaction between the two countries’ Chinese populations, 
consistent with ethnic business networks facilitating trade. 
 
  In receiving countries, immigration appears to disrupt the schooling of natives.  
The arrival of immigrants in native student’s age and schooling group is associated with 
deterioration in his performance at school or in his access to schooling.  The literature has 
yet to uncover the mechanisms behind these effects.  In sending countries, the literature 
has yet to identify how opportunities to emigrate affect the incentive to acquire skill, an 
issue of first order performance for understanding how emigration affects economic 
development.  There is indirect and anecdotal evidence that international migration 
promotes the flow of ideas between countries.   
 
5  DISCUSSION 
  There is ample evidence that international migration raises gross incomes for 
migrants, while it redistributes incomes within sending and receiving countries.  Because   35
the net impact of immigration on receiving countries appears to be small and because the 
gain to migration appears to be so large (owing to enormous international differences in 
labor productivity), it is natural to presume international migration raises global income.  
At this point, however, the literature does not allow one to do much more than make 
presumptions.  There remain many unknowns in evaluating migration’s impact. 
  Economic theory supports the presumption that international migration expands 
global output.  Moving labor from low productivity to high productivity countries 
improves allocative efficiency in the world economy.  No study suggests there are large 
negative consequences from global migration that would overturn this intuition.  In the 
US, which is the largest receiving country for immigrants, the short run net impact of 
immigration, to a first approximation, appears to be a wash (Borjas, 1999b).  The global 
gains from migration are largely captured by migrants themselves, which they share with 
family members at home through remittances.  Unless there are large unmeasured 
negative externalities from migration or migration exacerbates existing distortions in 
ways that have not yet been detected, one would be hard pressed, on economic grounds, 
to justify highly restrictive barriers to global labor flows. 
  While the gross income gain to migration appears to be large, the net gain is 
unknown.  There is little comprehensive evidence on the magnitude of migration costs.  
Measuring these costs may explain why global labor flows are so small.  Of course, a 
portion of migration costs are a byproduct of receiving-country restrictions on 
immigration.  Restrictions raise the premium on obtaining a student visa, or other form of 
temporary entry, which facilitate more permanent emigration.  They also create an 
incentive for illegal migration, allowing smugglers to capture a portion of the gains to   36
migration and dissipating another portion by subjecting migrants to psychic costs and 
physical risks associated with crossing borders without permission.  There is evidence 
that migrants underestimate the gains to migration (McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman, 
2007) and use networks to lower assimilation or job search costs (Munshi, 2003), 
suggesting uncertainty and informational barriers affect labor mobility. 
  The impact of immigration on receiving country labor markets is hotly disputed.  
The evidence would seem to favor the argument that wage effects from immigration do 
exist.  Studies using national level data, while subject to concerns about their ability to 
control for all relevant labor market shocks, yield consistent qualitative results across 
sending and receiving countries (with Israel being an exception).  The results are also 
consistent with observed changes in native labor supply.  Studies using local level data, 
whose results suggest immigration has little wage impact, are subject to concerns about 
the endogeneity of immigrant settlement patterns that have yet to be fully resolved. 
  The literature has focused on the wage effects of immigration, while largely 
ignoring impacts on non-labor income.  In theory, one would expect the gains in non-
labor income (plus the gains to workers that complement foreign labor) to more than 
offset the losses to workers than compete with immigrant labor.  There seems to be an 
implicit premise in existing research that knowing how immigration affects wages is 
sufficient to know how it affects national income.  Grounding empirical work in global 
general equilibrium may help address this shortcoming. 
  The net fiscal consequences of international migration are also poorly understood.  
In sending countries, there have only been a handful of studies on emigration’s fiscal 
impacts and these have focused on the movement of high-skilled workers to high-income   37
destinations.  In receiving countries, the impact of immigration on the net tax burden of 
the native population is a central issue in political opposition to labor inflows.  While 
there are many studies on how immigration affects government expenditure, there are 
few on how it affects government revenue, making it difficult to evaluate the net fiscal 
impact of labor inflows.  The few studies that do exist are now dated.   
  A further unknown is the effect of emigration on the incentive to acquire skill in 
sending countries.  In the cross-section, countries that have higher emigrant stocks abroad 
also have faster growth in the number of educated adults, but this association may or may 
not be informative about the consequences of brain drain.  We still do not know how 
changes in the opportunity to emigrate affect human capital accumulation.  Many 
individuals migrate abroad to complete their education, with many ultimately returning to 
their home countries.  This circular migration is important for the accumulation of skill in 
developing countries, though migrants from the poorest countries are those most tempted 
to emigrate permanently.  The policy implications for developing countries are unclear.  
While a mantra of the development community is that education is a public good, and 
therefore deserving of subsidies, improving high school or university training in the very 
poorest nations might actually increase brain drain by making it easier for high-ability 
individuals to obtain student visas, and ultimately employment visas, from rich countries 
(Rosenzweig, 2006).  Yet, even where migration is permanent, having emigrants abroad 
may help a country lower its barriers to trade, investment, and technology flows. 
The economics literature has yet to provide policy makers all the inputs they 
would need to choose sensible migration policies, even if officials were inclined to base 
their decisions on welfare grounds.  While the evidence suggests international migration   38
raises global income, there are many relevant details we do not know that are essential for 
determining how open borders should be and whether receiving countries should favor 
immigrants from particular countries or with particular characteristics.   39
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Table 1:  Percent of Foreign-Born Population in Total Population 
      Change 
    1995 2000 2005  1995-2005 
Australia  23.0 23.0 23.8  0.8 
Austria   10.5  13.5 
 
Belgium 9.7  10.3  12.1  2.4 
Canada  16.6 17.4 19.1  2.5 
Czech Republic    4.2  5.1  0.9 
Denmark  4.8 5.8 6.5  1.7 
Finland  2.0 2.6 3.4  1.4 
France (a)    10.0  8.1   
Germany (b)  11.5  12.5     
Greece (c)     10.3     
Hungary  2.8 2.9 3.3  0.5 
Ireland (d)   6.9  8.7  11.0  4.1 
Italy (c)     2.5     
Luxembourg  30.9 33.2 33.4  2.5 
Mexico  0.4 0.5 0.4  0.0 
Netherlands 9.1  10.1  10.6  1.5 
New Zealand (d)   16.2  17.2  19.4  3.2 
Norway  5.5 6.8 8.2  2.7 
Poland       
Portugal  5.4 5.1 6.3  0.9 
Slovak Republic (c)     2.5  3.9   
Spain (c)     5.3     
Sweden  10.5 11.3 12.4  1.9 
Switzerland  21.4 21.9 23.8  2.4 
Turkey   1.9    
United  Kingdom  6.9 7.9 9.7  2.8 
US 9.3  11.0  12.9  3.6 
 
Notes:  (a) 2000 value is from 1999; (b) 2004 value is from 2003; (c) 2000 value is 
from 2001; (d) 1995 value is from 1996. Source:  International Migration Outlook, 
OECD, 2006 (1995 data) and 2007. 
 
   48
 
Table 2:  Share of OECD Immigrants by Sending Region, 2000 
          
 
Share of Immigrants by  
OECD Receiving Region 
Change in 
OECD Share







Oceania  1990 to 2000
Mex., Cen. Am., Caribe  0.202  0.374  0.025  0.002  0.053 
Southeast Asia  0.102  0.137  0.039  0.160  0.016 
Eastern Europe  0.099  0.049  0.161  0.116  0.042 
Middle East  0.063  0.032  0.113  0.029  0.001 
South Asia  0.052  0.052  0.055  0.036  0.011 
North Africa  0.044  0.009  0.098  0.018  -0.006 
South America  0.041  0.050  0.031  0.035  0.010 
Cen., So. Africa  0.036  0.021  0.061  0.021  0.007 
Former Soviet Union  0.029  0.023  0.042  0.010  -0.002 
Pacific Islands  0.004  0.003  0.001  0.027  0.000 
Total 0.672  0.750  0.626  0.454  0.132 
          
High Income  
Sending Region           
Western Europe  0.244  0.152  0.336  0.368  -0.111 
Asia, Oceania  0.055  0.062  0.018  0.156  -0.010 
North America  0.029  0.037  0.020  0.023  -0.011 
Total 0.328  0.251  0.374  0.547  -0.132 
 
Notes:  This table shows data for 2000 on the share of different sending regions in the 
adult immigrant population of the entire OECD and of three OECD subregions.  High 
Income North America includes Canada and the U.S. and High Income Asia and Oceania 
includes Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, and Taiwan.  
Source:  author’s calculations using data from Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2007).   
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Table 3:  Share of OECD immigrants by destination region and education, 2000 
    Education  Group 
  Destination Region  All  Primary Secondary Tertiary
         
         
 North  America  0.514 0.352  0.540  0.655 
         
 Europe  0.384 0.560  0.349  0.236 
         
 Australia  &  Oceania  0.102 0.088  0.111  0.109 
         
  All OECD     0.355  0.292  0.353 
 
Notes:  This table shows the share of immigrants in OECD countries by schooling group 
and destination region for North America (Canada, Mexico the US); Australia & Oceania 
(Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Korea), and Europe (other OECD members as of 2000).  




Table 4: Gain in annual income from migrating from Mexico to the US 
 
Income measure  Source  Value 
US-Mexico difference in per capita GDP  World Development 
Indicators  $24,800 
US-Mexico difference in average annual 
earnings of 28 to 32 year old males with 9-
11 years of education 
Hanson (2006)  $10,600 
Estimated gain in annual earnings from US 
migration for a 35 year-old urban Mexican 





Average gain in income for a legal immigrant 
from Mexico with 9-12 years of education  Rosenzweig (2007)  $15,900 
 
All figures are in 2000 US dollars and adjusted for PPP.  
   50
Figure 1 
 







1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
 
Source:  United Nations (2005). 
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